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a b s t r a c t
Negative interpretation is thought to be crucial in the development and maintenance of depression.
Recently developed cognitive bias modiﬁcation paradigms, intending to change these biases towards
a more optimistic interpretation tendency (CBM-I), seem to offer new promising implications for
cognitive therapy innovation. This study aimed to increase our knowledge of the underlying mechanisms
of action of imagery-based CBM-I in the context of depressed mood. We therefore compared the efﬁcacy
of CBM-I requiring participants to imagine standardized positive resolutions to a novel, more active
training version that required participants to generate the positive interpretations themselves. Fifty-four
participants were randomly allocated to (1) standardized CBM-I, (2) self-generation CBM-I or (3)
a control group. Outcome measures included self-report mood measures and a depression-related
interpretation bias measure. Both positive training variants signiﬁcantly increased the tendency
to interpret fresh ambiguous material in an optimistic manner. However, only the standardized imagery
CBM-I paradigm positively inﬂuenced mood.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
In day-to-day life, we encounter numerous examples of infor-
mation that can be interpreted in more than one way, for instance
facial expressions, feedback from others or physiological cues.
How we disambiguate or make sense of these stimuli is important
for how we further respond to the world. To interpret one's dial-
ogue partner's yawning as a sign of boredom can obviously result
in a different, even opposite emotion than attributing it to a simple
lack of oxygen in the room. There is empirical consensus that
negatively biased interpretation, deﬁned as the tendency to consi-
stently interpret ambiguous stimuli in a negative manner, is
associated with dysphoria and depression and might play a key
role in the development of disorders (e.g. Butler and Mathews,
1983; Eley et al., 2008; Hertel and El-Messidi, 2006; Lawson et al.,
2002; Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000; Mogg et al., 2006; Rein-
ecke et al., Submitted for publication; Rude et al., 2002, Wisco and
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).
Cognitive bias modiﬁcation paradigms (CBM; Grey and
Mathews, 2000; Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000; Mathews and
MacLeod, 2002) are computerized training procedures that encou-
rage individuals to adopt a more positive (or negative) information
processing style. For instance, in interpretation bias training
procedures a more positive interpretation style can be trained by
repeatedly presenting virtual scenarios that combine initially
ambiguous information with a clearly positive outcome. An
example by Holmes et al. (2006) is as follows: “You have started
an evening class which is tough going. You are determined to
succeed, and after a while, it becomes much easier and more
enjoyable” (positive resolution in italics). Such procedures aim
to identify the role of cognitive biases in the development of
emotional disorders and have the potential to induce reductions in
symptom severity by changing bias towards a more positive
direction.
Although CBM-I has initially been developed for the training
of anxiety-related bias, positive beneﬁts of interpretation modiﬁ-
cation training could also be reported in the context of dysphoria
and depression by a number of studies (Blackwell and Holmes,
2010; Holmes et al., 2008, 2009, 2006; Lang et al., 2012; Lothmann
et al., 2011; Reinecke et al., Submitted for publication; Williams
et al., in press). Positive bias modiﬁcation has not only been shown
to be effective in modifying the interpretation of fresh ambiguous
information (e.g. Reinecke et al., Submitted for publication) in the
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trained direction, but it also ameliorates depressed mood and
positively inﬂuences resilience to negative mood induction (e.g.
Holmes et al., 2009).
A line of research (e.g. Holmes et al., 2009) has been inte-
rested in the most effective ingredients of these procedures. In line
with prior research suggesting a special relationship between
imagery and emotion (see Holmes and Mathews, 2005), Holmes
et al. (2009) found imagery, rather than verbal processing to be
crucial. Participants in the study were presented with 100 auditory
scenarios that were initially ambiguous but consistently resolved
in a positive manner. They were instructed to either imagine the
events or listen to them while thinking about their meaning.
Verbal processing of positive training material was not only less
effective than imagery, but even led to paradoxical, negative mood
responses. In other words, vividly imagining positive virtual
events can improve your mood as well as how you interpret
events, whereas only verbally thinking about the same positive
contents can make you feel worse and negatively inﬂuence how
you resolve ambiguities. Holmes et al. (2006, 2009) assumed that
this surprising discrepancy could have been caused by different
underlying mechanisms. While imagery might directly provoke
emotion like a positive “as-if” experience, verbal processing might
be perceived as less believable. It might more readily provoke
a comparison with one's actual status quo, that could – especially
in depressive individuals – turn out to be disadvantageous and
thus mood deteriorating. However, the mental visualization of
pleasant events alone does not guarantee positive emotion but
depends on the precise task instruction. Holmes et al. (2008)
demonstrated that only imagery from a ﬁeld perspective (“through
your own eyes”) improves affect as opposed to imagery from an
observer perspective (“looking at you”), that could – like verbal
processing – lead to adverse effects. Nelis et al. (2012) replicated
the impact of imagery vs. verbal processing for positive CBM-I, but
not of ﬁeld vs. observer perspective, suggesting that this aspect
requires further exploration. Based on these ﬁndings, effective
interpretation bias modiﬁcation can be obtained through a guided
imagery training that provides participants with acoustically
or visually presented descriptions of ambiguous virtual situations
that are consistently combined with positive resolutions that need
to be imagined from a ﬁeld perspective (Holmes et al., 2008; Pictet
et al., 2011).
Research in the context of anxiety-related interpretation bias
has found active selection of meaning during the training to be
critical for modifying subsequent emotional responses to new
ambiguous stimuli (Hoppitt et al., 2010). In this study, participants
were presented with threat-related ambiguous sentences that
were negatively resolved by the ﬁnal word, e.g. “You have decided
to go caving even though you feel nervous about being in such an
enclosed space. You get to the caves before anyone else arrived.
Going deep inside the ﬁrst cave you realize you have completely
lost your way.” (negative resolution in italics). While participants
in the passive group were presented with the entire passage,
individuals in the active group were presented with only a frag-
ment (one or more letters missing) of the ﬁnal word (“….
completely lost your w–.”) and therefore had to actively resolve
the meaning by themselves (only one possible completion). Active
selection of meaning was shown to be superior in modifying later
emotional responses in a training-congruent way to images of new
emotionally ambiguous descriptions presented after training than
mere passive exposure. Hoppitt et al. (2010) suggested that this
differential effect may be due to the induction of an implicit
production rule, in which participants in the active condition cont-
inue to actively generate training-congruent meanings of subse-
quent ambiguous scenarios.
The self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) suggests that people
infer (and modify) their attitudes, cognitions and emotions by
observing their overt behaviours. According to this theory a
person becomes, for instance, more committed to a certain
attitude or general cognition if they have to argue on behalf of
it (even when this position contradicts a previous attitude), in
other words “as I hear myself talk, I learn what I believe” (Bem,
1972; Laird and Bresler, 1992; Miller and Rollnick, 2002). This
principle has been supported by numerous studies. For example,
manipulated facial expressions can trigger changes in emotion
(e.g. Laird and Bresler, 1992) as well as changes in attitudes
(racial bias) as assessed by the Implicit Association Test (Ito
et al., 2006). Sharot et al. (2010) studied participants who rated
different vacation destinations both before and after making a
blind choice that could not be guided by pre-existing prefer-
ences. Their results demonstrated that choices not only reveal
preferences, but also shape them even when decisions were
made randomly. Interestingly, change in preferences was
observed only when participants believed they had been instru-
mental in making a decision, and not when the decision was
made by a computer. We hypothesised that the self-perception
principle could also be relevant for the modiﬁcation of cognitive
interpretation bias and be integrated in CBM-I procedures and
potentially enhance its effect by instructing participants to not
only imagine but to positively complete the initially ambiguous
scenarios by themselves.
The aim of this study was to develop a new, more active
variant of CBM-I and test its impact on positive mood and
interpretation bias in comparison to a control group as well as
imagery CBM-I. The purpose of this comparison was to further
our knowledge about the mechanisms of action underlying
successful CBM-I and to optimize its ingredients to enhance its
future therapeutic potential. The positive imagery CBM-I can be
described as a standardized guided imagery training that pro-
vides participants with auditorily presented descriptions of
ambiguous virtual everyday life situations that are consistently
combined with positive resolutions (e.g., Holmes et al., 2006).
The new training variant, however, instructs participants to not
only imagine but to positively complete the initially ambiguous
scenarios themselves by speaking one or two phrases into a
microphone. As participants in the new training variant have to
invent positive resolutions themselves, we expected that they
would perceive the scenarios as more authentic than participants
in the standardized guided imagery training. Further, the self-
generation of positive resolutions (and its subsequent vocalisa-
tion) can be seen as a more active process than guided imagery
and in terms of the self-perception theory be regarded as “overt
behaviour” that could lead to a (greater) modiﬁcation of cogni-
tions (interpretation bias) and internal states (mood). We there-
fore hypothesised that the self-generation variant would be more
effective in changing interpretation bias and mood towards a
more positive direction, based on the principles of self-
perception as well as prior ﬁndings by Hoppitt et al. (2010).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
54 participants (13 male, 41 female) took part in the study (age
in years: M¼22.0, SD¼2.9). They were recruited via online adver-
tisements at the website of the Technische Universität Dresden. The
majority of them were undergraduate students. One third of the
participants (29.6%) in this study showed BDI-scores above the
clinical cut-off score with 22.2% reporting symptoms of mild depres-
sion (BDI-scores: 14–19) and 7.5% reporting symptoms of moderate
depression (BDI-scores: 20–28). Reimbursement for participation
consisted of either a small participation fee (5€) or course credits.
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2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Questionnaire measures
The German version of the Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II;
Beck et al., 1996; Hautzinger et al., 2006) was used to measure
current levels of depressive symptoms. The trait version of the
German version of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI-T; Laux et al., 1981; Spielberger et al., 1983) was given
to assess trait anxiety. State positive and negative affect were
measured using the German version of the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Krohne et al., 1996; Watson et al., 1988).
The 20-item scale was administered with the short-term time
instruction (“indicate to what extent you feel this way now”) and
rated from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).
2.2.2. Interpretation bias measure
Interpretation bias was measured using the Ambiguous Sce-
narios Test for depression-related interpretation bias (AST-D-II;
Rohrbacher et al., Submitted for publication). This was developed
from the Ambiguous Scenarios Test (AST; Berna et al., 2011;
Holmes et al., 2009; Mathews and Mackintosh, 2000), where
ambiguous situational descriptions are presented that allow either
a positive or a negative outcome interpretation (e.g. It's the
morning of your birthday. The postman comes down the street
with their bag). The outcome measure is the emotional valence
rating of each description made by participants on a 9-point scale,
ranging from extremely unpleasant to extremely pleasant. The
AST-D-II consists of two 15-item parallel questionnaires in Ger-
man, one of which was presented before and after CBM-I,
respectively, with the order being pseudo-randomised and coun-
terbalanced between groups. Both versions have been shown to
possess high psychometric properties, including high-parallel-
reliability (Rohrbacher et al., Submitted for publication).
2.2.3. Interpretation bias modiﬁcation training
Participants were randomly assigned to (1) standardized CBM-I-,
(2) self-generation CBM-I, or (3) a control group (CG). Using the
CBM-I paradigm described by Holmes et al. (2006), participants
in all three groups were presented with 50 auditory scenarios.
A deﬁnition of mental imagery was given. Then participants were
instructed to vividly imagine these scenarios from a ﬁeld-perspec-
tive, and to try not to engage in verbal thoughts about the scenarios,
such as making comparisons between the scenario and themselves
(for details on instructions with practice examples, see Holmes et al.
(2008, 2009)). Across the three training conditions, the ﬁrst part of a
speciﬁc scenario was identical (e.g. “You are on your way to the
photographer to pick up your new portrait pictures. As you look at
the photos you are quite surprised.”). This part was also ambiguous
in that it allowed either a positive or a negative outcome. Each
statement lasted about 5–10 s. Scenarios in all groups were rec-
orded using the same female voice and presented stereo-phonically
through headphones.
The second part of the scenarios differed between training
conditions. In the standardized CBM-I condition, the auditory
description continued directly on with the positive resolution (e.
g. “ The pictures are much better than you expected.”). Participants
had to vividly imagine the complete scenario including its positive
resolution (no time limit was given) and then had to press a
“continue”—button to start the next scenario. Participants in the
condition self-generation CBM-I were presented the initial part of
the scenario. They were instructed (before training) to vividly
imagine the auditorily presented scenario and to resolve its
ambiguity by imagining a positive completion by themselves.
After the imagery part (no time limit was given) participants had
to press a “start”-button and were asked to describe their actively
generated positive resolution by speaking a few words into
a microphone (all completions were recorded in order to check
for compliance). Individuals had to press a “continue”—button to
start the next scenario. Participants in the control group were
merely presented the ﬁrst part of the scenario with no resolution.
They had to vividly imagine each scenario and had to press a
“continue”—button to start the next scenario.
2.2.4. Filler
Following previous studies (e.g. Holmes et al., 2006), in order
to equalize mood levels after training between the three groups
(before the application of the interpretation bias test), participants
were presented with a series of classical music extracts for a 10-
min interval after the interpretation bias training. Participants
were asked to rate the extracts with respect to their pleasantness.
2.2.5. Manipulation checks
During the training, participants gave ratings at the end of each
10th scenario regarding the previously presented scenario. Parti-
cipants were asked to rate (a) to what degree they had been able
to vividly imagine the scenario (vividness) (b) as how realistic they
had experienced the presented scenario (authenticity) and (c)
as how pleasant they had perceived the presented scenario
(pleasantness). Responses were rated on a 9-point scale, ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).
2.2.6. Memory questions/expectancy beliefs
Furthermore, participants were given ﬁve memory questions at
the end of the session (e.g. “What present did you buy for your
partner (in one of the presented scenarios)?”). These questions
were part of the cover story and additionally served as a ﬁlter to
exclude participants with insufﬁcient ability to concentrate on the
training. Since imagery has been associated with enhanced learn-
ing and memory effects (e.g. Schwartz and Heiser, 2005), we
expected participants to recollect the majority of the memory
questions. As previous pilot-testing revealed that most pilot-
participants were able to correctly answer 4 to 5 of the memory
questions, an exclusion cut-off of less than three correct answers
was determined a priori. None of the participants fell below that
cut-off. In addition, participants were asked to guess the purpose
of the study (“In your opinion, what is the purpose of this study?”)
after completion of the experiment in order to estimate possible
demand or expectancy effects.
2.3. Procedure
In order to decrease expectancy as well as demand effects,
participants were provided with a cover story. They were told that
the purpose of the study was to examine the association between
memory effects and spatial representations, and that they would
have to answer several questions concerning their mental
images after an imagery-task (experimental phase). After having
given informed consent and being randomly assigned to one of the
three training-conditions, participants completed BDI-II,
STAI-T, PANAS, as well as the pre-test of the AST-D-II. After the
experimental phase (CBM-I), they again completed the PANAS. This
state questionnaire was given for a third time after the 10 min ﬁller
task. Participants then completed the post-test AST-D-II. They
completed the manipulation check ratings (vividness, authenticity,
pleasantness) during the training. At the end of the study, they
answered ﬁve memory questions and were asked about their
expectancy beliefs regarding the aim of the study.
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3. Results
3.1. Comparison of participants in the three training conditions at
baseline
Questionnaire scores of all baseline measures are depicted in
Table 1. The three CBM groups were not different in terms of gender
ratio, X2(2)¼0.20, p¼ .90, mean age (F(2,53)¼0.20, p¼ .82), depres-
sive symptoms (BDI-II; F(2,53)¼2.20, p¼ .12), trait anxiety (STAI-T;
(F(2,53)¼1.30, p¼ .28), mood (PANAS-positive; F(2,53)¼0.45,
p¼ .64; PANAS-negative; F(2,53)¼0.94, p¼ .40), nor interpretation
tendencies (pre-training AST-D-II; F(2,53)¼0.40, p¼ .67).
3.2. Effects over training—Changes in mood measured with the
PANAS
Two 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVAs with the within-factor
time (pre- vs. post training) and the between-factor group (CG,
standardized CBM-I, self-generation CBM-I) were calculated using
the pre- and post-test scores of the PANAS as the dependent
variables, separated for the positive and the negative PANAS subscale
(Table 1, Fig. 1). Negative subscale: There was no signiﬁcant main
effect of the factors time, F(1,51)¼0.09, p¼ .76, or group, F(2,51)¼
1.15, p¼ .32, nor a signiﬁcant interaction, all F(2,51)¼0.54, p¼ .58,
indicating that none of the trainings lead to a change in negative
mood. Positive subscale: There was no main effect of group, F(2,51)¼
1.27, p¼ .29, but a signiﬁcant effect of time, F(1,51)¼10.56, po .01,
η2p¼ .17, as well as a signiﬁcant interaction between time and group,
F(2,51)¼4.05, p¼ .02, η2p¼ .14, indicating differential changes in
positive mood in the three groups during training. Additional
paired-samples t-tests comparing pre- and post-CBM mood scores,
separated for the three CBM groups, indicated a signiﬁcant increase
of positive mood during standardized CBM-I, t(17)¼4.32, po .01,
whereas no change was found in self-generation CBM-I, t(17)¼1.17,
p¼ .26, and the control group, t(17)¼0.35, p¼ .73. There was a trend
level difference between the three groups' levels of positive affect
post-CBM, F(2,51)¼2.43, p¼ .09. In summary, our analysis revealed
no changes in negative mood in any of the training conditions, but an
increase of positive mood in the standardized CBM-I used in earlier
studies.
3.2.1. Mood change during the ﬁller task
To assess whether the mood improvement during training in
the standardized CBM-I group survives a neutral ﬁller task or is
rather transient, we ran an additional 23 repeated measures
ANOVA with the within-factor time (pre- vs. post ﬁller) and the
between-factor group, using the pre- and post-ﬁller task scores
Table 1
Characteristics of participants and effects over training.
Control group (n¼18) Standardized CBM-I (n¼18) Self-generation CBM-I (n¼18)
M SD M SD M SD
Age 22.2 2.7 21.6 3.5 22.0 2.6
% Female 78.0 0.4 72.0 0.5 78.0 0.4
STAI Trait 45.8 5.1 43.9 6.3 46.7 4.3
BDI-II 8.7 5.6 10.3 6.7 12.8 5.0
PANAS-positive
Pre-training 31.94 5.88 32.77 4.25 31.14 5.17
Post-training 32.17 6.25 35.21 3.81 31.77 5.00
After ﬁller 33.00 6.05 35.26 3.92 32.40 4.81
PANAS-negative
Pre-training 12.89 3.45 11.73 1.99 12.44 1.97
Post-training 13.06 5.03 11.34 2.01 12.45 2.08
After ﬁller 12.83 3.78 11.29 1.55 12.34 1.93
AST-D-II
Pre-training 0.83 0.74 0.55 1.19 0.74 0.93
Post-training 0.81 0.87 1.48 1.32 1.33 0.93
Ratings during training
Vividness 1.98 1.55 2.78 1.15 1.99 1.62
Authenticity 1.24 1.37 1.77 1.00 1.40 1.40
Pleasantness 0.70 0.98 2.73 1.63 1.66 1.36
Memory questions after training (% of correct answers) 4.39 0.50 4.22 0.43 4.44 0.51
Note: STAI¼State-trait anxiety inventory; BDI-II¼Beck depression inventory II; PANAS¼Positive and negative affect schedule; AST-D-II¼Ambiguous scenario test II.
Fig. 1. Mood change scores are calculated as the difference between the PANAS post-training score and the PANAS pre-training score; positive scores reﬂect an increase on
the measure, negative scores a decrease. Error bars show the standard deviation of the mean. Note: PANAS¼positive and negative affect schedule.
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of the positive subscale of the PANAS as the dependent variable.
The was no signiﬁcant main effect of group, F(2,51)¼2.02, p¼ .14,
but a signiﬁcant effect of time, F(1,51)¼57.36, po .01, η2p¼ .53, and
a signiﬁcant interaction between time and group, F(2,51)¼12.16,
po .01, η2p¼ .32, indicating differential changes in mood in the
three groups during the ﬁller task. Follow-up paired-samples
t-tests, comparing pre- and post-ﬁller positive mood, indicated
a signiﬁcant increase of positive mood in the control group,
t(17)¼9.22, po .01 and self-generation CBM-I, t(17)¼3.69,
po .01, whereas no change was found in standardized CBM-I, t
(17)¼1.00, p¼ .33. In summary, our analysis revealed no mood
transition in standardized CBM-I, but mood changes in self-
generation CBM-I as well as in the control group.
3.3. Mood after the ﬁller task
Two one-way ANOVAs, separated for the negative and the
positive subscale of the PANAS, were run for the scores recorded
after the ﬁller task to compare mood across the three CBM groups.
No signiﬁcant differences between the three training groups were
found, neither for negative nor positive affect scores, both F(2,53)
o1.65, both p4 .20. This indicates that the groups were compar-
able prior to the administration of the bias tasks.
3.4. Effects over training—Interpretation bias measured via AST-D-II
A 23 repeated measures ANOVA with the within-factor time
(pre- vs. post training) and the between factor group (CG, stan-
dardized CBM-I, self-generation CBM-I) with the pre- and post-
training scores of the AST-D-II as the dependent variables was run
(Table 1, Fig. 2). The analysis yielded no main effect of group,
F(2,51)¼0.30, p¼ .74, but a signiﬁcant effect of time, F(1,51)¼
16.68, po .01, η2p¼ .25, and a signiﬁcant interaction between time
and group, F(2,51)¼5.23, po .01, η2p¼ .17, indicating differential
changes in interpretation bias in the three groups during training.
Additional paired samples t-tests separately conducted for each of
the three groups indicated a signiﬁcant increase of positive
interpretation bias during training in the standardized CBM-I
group, t(17)¼3.69, po .01, and the self-generation CBM-I group, t
(17)¼3.33, po .01, whereas no change was found in the CG, t(17)¼
0.13, p¼ .90. Independent-samples t-tests suggested no difference
between the training effect scores of standardized CBM-I and self-
generation CBM-I, t(34)¼1.08, p¼ .29, indicating these two train-
ings as equally effective in changing interpretation style towards
a more positive direction. There was no signiﬁcant difference in
AST-D-II scores post-training between the three groups, F(2,51)¼
1.98, p¼ .15. In summary, participants in the positive training
conditions, but not in the control group, showed a similar increase
of positive interpretation as measured with the AST-D-II.
3.5. Manipulation checks/memory questions/expectancy beliefs
Using one-way ANOVAs, the groups did not differ regarding their
ratings of the vividness and the authenticity of the situation samples,
nor their imagery-related memory performance, all F(2,53)o1.82,
p4 .17. However, a signiﬁcant difference was found regarding
their pleasantness ratings, F(2,53)¼1.82, po .01, η2p¼ .54. Subsequent
post-hoc pair wise comparisons (Bonferroni) revealed that the
control group rated the scenarios as signiﬁcantly less pleasant than
did the two positive training conditions (both po .01). None of the
participants correctly guessed the purpose of the study when asked
at the end.
4. Discussion
The goal of this study was to design and evaluate a new self-
generation variant of imagery CBM-I and test its effectiveness in
comparison to a control group as well as standard or guided
imagery CBM-I. The purpose of this comparison was to increase
the knowledge about the mechanisms of action behind this
cognitive bias modiﬁcation procedure. Our self-generation version
of CBM-I increased positive interpretation, whereas no such
change was seen in the control condition. We had assumed that
self-generation CBM-I would be more effective than the standar-
dized variant, based on the principles of self-perception as well as
prior ﬁndings by Hoppitt et al. (2010), but in fact our ﬁndings did
not support this prediction. Contrary to hypothesis, the effect of
self-generation CBM-I on interpretation bias was not superior
compared to the standardized CBM-I. Moreover, the new CBM-I
variant had no effect on either positive or negative mood. In
contrast, the type of instruction used in earlier studies led to
a signiﬁcant increase in positive mood. These results do not
conﬁrm the expected superiority of a more active CBM-I version
involving self-generation of positive resolutions in enhancing
mood and interpretation, but rather advocate the use of standar-
dized scripts for imagery-based CBM-I to target depressive mood.
How can these ﬁndings be explained? We had suggested that
the self-generation of positive resolutions (and its subsequent
vocalisation) as a more active and overt behaviour would lead –
according to the self-perception theory – to greater changes in
interpretation bias as well as mood. We had expected that
observing themselves generating the (positive) resolutions for
the scenarios would facilitate participants internalising these
resolutions as their own expectations for the outcomes of the
imagined situations. From a self-perception theory perspective,
the lack of additional effect on modiﬁcation of interpretation bias
of this self-generation could perhaps be explained by the idea that
mental imagery from a ﬁeld perspective is like an “as-if” experi-
ence (cf. Holmes et al., 2009). That is, even if the imagery is guided,
when participants imagine themselves engaging in and experien-
cing the positive outcomes, they modify their cognitions in line
with what they experience themselves thinking, feeling, and doing
—albeit in their minds' eye. It may be that the process of creating a
scenario resolution to imagine and vocalising it verbally adds
nothing on top of this. Consistent with this, analysis of ratings
during the training revealed that participants in self-generation
CBM-I did not perceive the training situations as more authentic
than those in standardized CBM-I. That is, while we had expected
that inventing the positive resolutions for themselves might lead
to participants experiencing the scenarios as more authentic
(i.e. realistic) this was not in fact the case. We suggest that this
ﬁnding might be because imagery in ﬁeld perspective – whether
Fig. 2. Bias change scores are calculated as the difference between the AST-D-II
post-training score and the AST-D-II pre-training score; positive scores reﬂect an
increase in a positive direction. Error bars show the standard deviation of the mean.
Note: AST-D-II¼Ambiguous scenario test II.
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guided or self-generated – precludes the kind of evaluative
thought processes that might lead to ﬁnding the scenarios
unrealistic (cf. Holmes et al., 2009). Therefore, attempting to
increase the believability by other means (e.g. self-generation of
the resolution) may not add anything above encouraging vivid
ﬁeld-perspective imagery.
Interestingly, the ﬁnding of similar effects on interpretation after
self-generated and standardized CBM-I could be seen as also contrast-
ing with previous research, showing stronger effects of “active”
compared to “passive” procedures in modifying later responses to
new emotionally ambiguous descriptions (Hoppitt et al., 2010).
However, importantly, substantial differences in study designs might
account for this apparent contradiction. First, the present study
explored the potential of two depression-speciﬁc positive CBM-I
versions in altering interpretation, while the previous study investi-
gated anxiety-speciﬁc negative CBM-I. Furthermore, while in our more
“active” training variant (self-generated resolutions) participants had
to freely invent positive resolutions to then incorporate these into
mental imagery, Hoppitt et al. (2011) asked their participants to
resolve a fragmented word at the end of a written scenario, with only
one solution being possible. Finally, in contrast to the “passive”
condition used by Hoppitt et al. (2011), the CBM-I using standardized
scripts does require participants to actively engage in the emotional
valence of the training material, by generating a ﬁeld-perspective
mental image of the situation described. Such differences in target
disorder, CBM-I complexity and demand, and the use of mental
imagery might be relevant for the interpretation of results.
Why was there an unexpected lack of mood improvement
during our self-generation CBM-I training as opposed to the
signiﬁcant increase of positive mood in standardized CBM-I, that
even remained stable over a ﬁller task? Perhaps the generation of
positive outcomes may (at least in this study) place a higher
demand on concentration and performance, reducing any potential
increase in positive affect. The requirement to concentrate on self-
generating an ending may have also disrupted participants' absorp-
tion in the positive imagery, reducing its emotional impact, or
resulted in more evaluative post-processing of the image via the
requirement to monitor the valence of the ending generated.
That is, having to “think about” the positive endings may have
distracted from the “as if” processing that characterizes mental
imagery, and promoted more comparative, evaluative processing
(cf. Holmes et al., 2009). The two training groups did not differ
regarding their pleasantness-ratings, we therefore assume that the
self-generated resolutions were perceived as equally positive as the
standardized resolutions. However, the pleasantness-ratings do not
allow conclusions about the objective positivity. This could be an
interesting aim for a follow-up study in which the self-generated
resolutions are used as guided solutions in the standardized
condition to control for objective positivity. It is also worth noting
that the explicit information in the self-generation condition that
participants would have to generate positive resolutions to all of the
training scenarios may have reduced the initial ambiguity of the
stems, as participants would be aware from the start of each
scenario that it would end positively (cf. Clarke et al., in press).
What might be the signiﬁcance of the greater increase in
positive mood seen in the standardized imagery CBM-I? Although
the main aim of the CBM-I paradigm may be to train more positive
interpretation, if the training sessions also boost positive mood
then this may have signiﬁcant implications for future clinical
application in depression. Positive affect may be an important
determinant of clinical outcome in depression, with lack of
positive affect predicting poorer prognosis (e.g. Morris et al.,
2009), and early improvement in positive affect predicting
response to antidepressant treatment (Geschwind et al., 2011).
Furthermore, there is some preliminary evidence that repeated
practice in upregulating the neural areas involved in generating
positive emotions may provide a promising route for novel
treatment development (Linden et al., 2012). Thus, although the
paradigm's primary aim may not be to boost positive affect, this
aspect of it may help increase its potential clinical impact. On a
very practical level, if a depressed individual was completing the
CBM-I in their home environment, then even a transient increase
in positive mood following completion of a training session could
potentially have a positive impact on subsequent activities.
Increasing our understanding of the regulation of positive affect
in depression may help to capitalise on such transient increases
and increase possible therapeutic beneﬁts (Raes et al., 2012;
Werner-Seidler et al., 2013). Finally, even if the increase in positive
affect had no signiﬁcant clinical impact, the expectation of a boost
in positive mood may enhance motivation to engage with a CBM-I
treatment schedule. Our ﬁnding that the mood improvement in
standardized CBM-I was maintained over a ﬁller task seems very
encouraging in terms of stability. However, follow-up studies are
needed to clarify prolonged mood effects or their sustained effect
after a negative mood induction to verify clinical utility.
On the basis of prior research (e.g. Holmes et al., 2006, 2009) and
supported by our ﬁndings we conclude that imagery CBM-I using
standardized scripts, as in previous studies, is the most useful form to
pursue. This is perhaps a promising outcome for clinical translation, as
people with depressed mood may ﬁnd it particularly difﬁcult to
generate positive interpretations (cf. Wisco and Nolen-Hoeksema,
2010), and thus a standardized imagery CBM-I paradigm may be
easier to engage in successfully. Imagery techniques may work
relatively well at an emotional level (Holmes and Mathews, 2005),
as opposed to cognitive therapy that focuses on rational and verbal
techniques such as identifying distorted thinking and challenging
dysfunctional beliefs. Further, imagery has been associated with
enhanced learning and memory effects (e.g. Schwartz and Heiser,
2005) and may have potential longer term effects. It may be that
efforts to increase the effectiveness of imagery-based CBM-I should
focus on enhancing the use of imagery in the training, or on reﬁning
the composition of the standardized training scenarios, rather than by
incorporating non-imagery processing requirements into the tasks.
A few limitations of the study need to be highlighted. First, our
assessments relied on self-report, involving the risk of response
bias. However, as none of the individuals in our sample correctly
guessed the study purpose, the inﬂuence of demand or expectancy
effects on results is rather unlikely. Furthermore, preliminary
studies using more involuntary, psycho-physiological measures
of interpretation provide further evidence for the association
between interpretation bias and depression (e.g. Moser et al.,
2012). Nevertheless, future studies into the effect of CBM on mood
and interpretation bias are encouraged to incorporate more
objective measures. Second, although participants rated vividness
of imagery equally in all three conditions, we did not measure the
participants' baseline imagery ability and so do not know whether
these ratings were equally accurate in all conditions. Follow-up
studies should therefore measure trait imagery and also ask
participants to provide further ratings of their imagery (e.g.
“positiveness”) in order to obtain a fuller picture of their experi-
ence of it. A third issue that needs to be considered refers to the
generalizability of the present results to patients with depressive
disorders and to the interpretation of real-life situations. Given the
fact that one third of the participants (29.6%) in this study showed
BDI-scores above the clinical cut-off score (BDI-scores414) makes
transfer to clinical samples very promising. Future studies should
investigate the longer term impact of the immediate effects of the
CBM-I on bias and mood, and their importance in both near and
far transfer of the training (Hertel and Mathews, 2011).
In summary, the current study adds further support to the
potential therapeutic signiﬁcance of guided CBM-I-based imagery
techniques and evaluated a new, self-generation variant of CBM-I.
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